The Vogue of Jewish Self-Hatred in Post-World War II America
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Jewish Social Studies, Volume 12, Number 3, Spring/Summer 2006
(New Series), pp. 95-136 (Article)

Published by Indiana University Press
DOI: 10.1353/jss.2006.0025

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From the very beginning of his literary career in the 1950s, novelist Philip Roth faced charges of antisemitism, Jewish “self-hatred,” and willful “betrayal” of the Jewish people. In 1959, when *The New Yorker* magazine published his short story “Defender of the Faith”—about a Jewish army recruit who uses his religion to gain special privileges from his Jewish sergeant—Roth was accused of being a “self-hating Jew” whose writings caused “irreparable damage to the Jewish people,” as much “harm,” charged one irate reader, “as all the organized anti-Semitic organizations.”

Roth was not the first or the only writer in America to be labeled a self-hating Jew. A decade earlier, Isaac Rosenfeld had faced similar accusations after the publication of his essay “Adam and Eve on Delancey Street” (a meditation on the relationship between Jewish sexual and culinary taboos) in the American Jewish Committee-sponsored magazine *Commentary*. Denouncing Rosenfeld’s essay as filthy and degrading to Jews, Zionist activist Carl Alpert compared its effects to “the best efforts of [Nazi propagandists] Streicher and Goebbels.” In 1957, literary critic Sol Liptzin would use virtually identical language when he pointed to “the vogue of Jewish self-hatred” in American Jewish literature. Singling out novelists like Ben Hecht, Budd Schulberg, and Michael Gold, Liptzin charged that their “literary misdeeds” in the

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1930s had “furnished an abundance of scandalous material to the American followers of Hitler and Streicher.”

Why “Jewish self-hatred”? Historians have largely overlooked the proliferating discourse on “Jewish self-hatred” in 1940s and 1950s America, focusing instead on the earlier “vogue” in fin de siècle Germany and Austria where assimilated intellectuals had publicly denounced the habits and mannerisms of the “uncouth” Ostjuden (East European Jews). As Paul Reitter has put it, writers like Viennese journalist Karl Kraus and philosopher Otto Weininger are often cited as personifications of the term “Jewish self-hatred.” Historians have also focused on the idea of Jewish self-hatred as a critical theme in the German Zionist ideology of Jewish self-regeneration. Often mentioned is Theodor Lessing, whose widely cited 1930 book, Der Jüdische Selbsthass (Jewish Self-Hatred), described his own journey from Jewish self-loathing to Zionism. Like Theodor Herzl and others before him, Lessing insisted that the “tragedy of Jewish exile” in the Diaspora had undermined Jewish pride, dignity, and self-esteem. Centuries of anti-Semitic oppression and slavish devotion to the ideal of “Germanness,” Lessing argued, produced a psychopathology of self-hatred—especially manifest among assimilated intellectuals but also found in the broader society—a disease that could only be cured by a separate Jewish homeland.

Those who have studied the German context disagree about whether the term Jewish self-hatred was (and is) a cultural construct or an actual psychological “syndrome.” Some, like Sander Gilman, blur the lines by portraying self-hatred as both a theory and a description of fin de siècle German Jewish psychopathology. Others describe self-hatred as a generalized symptom of Jewish emancipation and assimilation. Still others see it as a particular symptom of cosmopolitan Jewish intellectuals or an unconscious attitude of the Jewish “Left.” One historian dismisses the usefulness of the term Jewish self-hatred altogether, pointing out that it has largely served polemical rather than analytical purposes. Another argues for greater analytical precision. In a historically grounded case study of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century British and German Jewry, Todd Endelman warns against the polemical misuses of the concept but insists on its descriptive value so long as the historian follows certain “ground rules for its usage.” It would be “foolish to apply it indiscriminately to any and all Jews who attacked or derided the habits and manners of other Jews,” Endelman argues as he makes the case for distinguishing actual “self-hatred” (which he sees largely as a German-Jewish phenomenon) from the venerable tradition of Jewish “self-criticism.”
My purpose is not to interrogate the descriptive usefulness of the term or to devise a new measure for distinguishing “self-hatred” from “self-criticism.” Instead of arguing for an objective understanding of the idea of Jewish self-hatred, I analyze the historicity of the concept itself—its “contingent, temporally and socially situated” operations in the discourse of wartime and postwar America. To understand the charges against Roth, Rosenfeld, and other American writers and intellectuals who were labeled “self-hating Jews,” we need to go well beyond the deliberately provocative aspects of their writings and consider the broader historical context in which such criticism arose. In this article I examine the various deployments of the term “Jewish self-hatred” as they emerged against the backdrop of larger national and international developments. I argue that the preoccupation with Jewish self-hatred in the United States both reflected and helped constitute growing concern among Jews about the effects of assimilation and the prospects for continued group “survival” in the aftermath of the Holocaust. Although historians of the American Jewish experience have characterized the American mid-century as a “time for healing,” a “golden age” for Jews, and a period characterized by “the emergence of a collective self-confidence and sense of well-being,” the vogue of Jewish self-hatred tells a different kind of story. It reveals the growing fault lines within postwar American Jewish culture and suggests that “survival anxiety” did not emerge suddenly in the 1960s but grew gradually over the course of the preceding two decades.

From “Inferiority Complex” to “Jewish Self-Hatred”

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the concept of Jewish self-hatred had attracted relatively little attention among Jewish psychological experts in the United States. In the early part of the century, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, and psychologists (among them A. A. Brill and Abraham Myerson) generally agreed that Jews were more “nervous” and “anxiety ridden” than other groups—a pattern generally attributed to a combination of Christian persecution and the “taboos and inhibitions of Mosaic law.” However, the term “Jewish self-hatred” had not yet entered the popular lexicon. The closest concept, “inferiority complex”—popularized by Viennese immigrant analyst Alfred Adler—was used to describe the insecurities of Jews and non-Jews and eventually became part of the general psychological jargon of late-1920s America. With the rise in organized antisemitism in the 1930s, American Jewish psychologists debated whether Jews suffered disproportionately from the
inferiority complex. Although there was considerable disagreement, at least some argued that low social status and ongoing persecution produced a “Jewish personality” type characterized by a “peculiar self-consciousness” and a tendency toward “self-negation.” But it was not until the 1940s that the term Jewish self-hatred—thought to be the most extreme outcome of the inferiority complex—gained wide theoretical currency in the United States.

The 1940s and 1950s might well be described as the age of self-hatred. When the term “Jewish self-hatred” came into critical vogue in the aftermath of World War II, it dramatically transformed the public discourse on Jewish identity. Judging from “the common testimony of rabbis and novelists, of sociological surveys and table talk,” wrote political scientist Nathan A. Pelcovitz in 1947, Jewish self-hatred was “the neurosis” of the wartime generation. “That many Jews who reached intellectual maturity in the age of Hitler reject and despise the fact of their Jewishness is a family secret we can no longer keep either from the children or the neighbors.” According to Pelcovitz, all the experts now agreed that the problem had reached “epidemic proportions” and that “the hero of Wasteland is not alone in his confusions.”

Wasteland, a 1946 novel by Jo Sinclair (pseudonym for Ruth Seid), told the story of John Brown (a.k.a. Jake Braunowitz), a “self-hating Jew” who passes as a gentile and eventually (with the help of his gentile Freudian analyst) returns to the Jewish fold. Sinclair’s novel dealt with the most extreme manifestation of Jewish identity conflict, but it also mirrored the growing postwar tendency of Jewish experts to view the desire for assimilation in psychological rather than in cultural and social terms. The fact that “a large proportion of American Jewry” finds no “positive significance” in its “Jewishness” was largely a “psychological problem,” wrote one Jewish educator in 1946. For this writer, as for others, the key issue came down to “personality adjustment.”

Jewish self-hatred was more than a recognized syndrome in the psychological literature of postwar America; it was also a powerful category of social criticism. The phrase provided a potent rhetorical slogan—the polemicist’s “most popular weapon,” in the words of literary critic Allen Guttmann—and a theory “as attractive as . . . the Oedipal complex” had been to the society of the 1920s and 1930s. Meyer Levin’s 1956 novel Compulsion suggests, for example, that the infamous Leopold and Loeb murder of Bobby Franks in 1924 was motivated by “Jewish self-hatred.” Contrary to what the defendants had argued at their trial (which Levin had covered as a young reporter), the choice of murder victim was hardly random. In Levin’s fictional account, Judd Steiner (Richard Leopold)—the brilliant, wealthy, sex-
ually confused son of a prominent German Jewish family—had murdered Paulie Kessler (Franks) in an act of symbolic Jewish “self-destruction.” The assailants “picked a boy, a Jewish boy” and not just any Jewish boy but “the son of a pawnbroker, the symbol of everything that is shameful in being a Jew.”

Yet so inflammatory was the idea of Jewish self-hatred that other writers who critically examined the issue were themselves accused of Jewish self-contempt or charged with fanning the flames of antisemitism. When sociologist Nathan Glazer reviewed Eagle Before My Eyes, Norman Katkov’s 1948 novel about intermarriage and the problem of antisemitism, he decided that the author bore “a tremendous load of self-hatred as a Jew.” The overriding emotion in the novel is “fear,” wrote Glazer, the “context . . . a cold, menacing world without Jews, in which one’s life is determined—more accurately, ruined—by being a Jew.”

The following year, when Arthur Laurents previewed his play Home of the Brave—about a self-loathing Jewish soldier who is literally and figuratively paralyzed by the psychic wounds of internalized antisemitism—the Anti-Defamation League set up a picket line in front of the theater to protest what they considered the image of an excessively neurotic Jewish character. Not until Laurents removed some of the offending dialogue could the play open on Broadway. Hortense Calisher provoked an even more serious controversy when, in 1950, The New Yorker published “Old Stock,” her short story about the conceits of a self-hating German Jewish mother who fears she will be identified with the very qualities “she hated in her own race.” The “bundles of hate mail” that arrived from Jewish readers accused Calisher of further polluting “the already half-poisoned air” surrounding the Jews by exposing the “tormenting self-doubts,” “secret fears,” and “self-hatred” that “centuries of stress had bred in us.”

How and why did the concept of Jewish self-hatred come into literary, theoretical, and polemical vogue in 1940s and 1950s America? And what was its social and rhetorical purchase? During and after the war, individuals and groups across the intellectual, social, cultural, religious, and political spectrum deployed the term variously, inconsistently, and with conflicting social and political agendas. In what follows, I discuss a number of convergent intellectual streams that brought the concept of Jewish self-hatred to the center of Jewish and American social thought.

The post–World War II vogue of Jewish self-hatred grew out of three overlapping developments. First was the mounting influence of psychological experts and psychological thinking on American public life in the 1940s and 1950s. Second and closely related was the influence...
of Jewish émigré intellectuals and social theorists from Berlin, Frankfurt, and Vienna. Bringing European perspectives on antisemitism and Jewish self-consciousness to bear on wartime and postwar discussions of minority group psychology in the United States, they endowed the concept of “Jewish self-hatred” with social scientific authority. Third, and most central to this article, was the deployment of those same theoretical paradigms in what might best be described as the “Jewish Cold War”—a contentious public debate revolving around the question of Jewish group loyalty, Jewish group “survival,” and Jewish nationalism. This debate—a struggle between advocates of Jewish particularism and nationalism and defenders of liberal universalism and cosmopolitanism—was the latest in a succession of longstanding disagreements about the relationship of Jews to the wider non-Jewish society. The escalating polemics of self-hatred forced the universalists to define and defend their Jewishness in the face of charges of disloyalty to the Jewish collectivity.

“Self-Hatred” and the Psychological Moment

The conceptual vogue of Jewish self-hatred and its analogue “Negro self-hatred” was part of the broader psychological moment in American social science, public policy, and public culture, a development influenced by the arrival of refugee scholars from Nazi Germany. Although the psychological moment did not come about suddenly in the 1940s, as Ellen Herman and other historians have shown, the war brought new prestige and authority to psychologically oriented experts of all kinds. Psychologists, anthropologists, and other social researchers working in and outside of government agencies theorized the underlying psychological structures of German and Japanese “national character,” designed strategies for psychological warfare, analyzed the potential of formerly totalitarian regimes to become democratic societies, examined the psychological dimensions of civilian morale, and probed the emotional roots and psychological effects of antisemitism and racism.22

Psychological paradigms also played a critical role in postwar discussions of minority group self-esteem. The rise of Nazism and the escalating problem of racism and antisemitism on the American home front fueled a broad investigation into the causes and consequences of extreme prejudice. By the end of the 1940s, a growing body of work—social scientific, philosophical, and literary—on the effects of prejudice on minority group self-consciousness created an intellectual conver-
gence zone in which the figure of the “self-hating Jew” and his black counterpart the “negrophobic negro” were imagined, in Martiniquean psychiatrist Frantz Fanon’s phrasing, as “brother[s] in misery.”

In postwar America, liberal social scientists concerned with minority group self-esteem dedicated themselves to “action research” on the practices and attitudes of discrimination. With funding from the American Jewish Congress, German émigré social psychologist Kurt Lewin established the Commission on Community Interrelations (CCI) in New York City to carry out experiments on group attitudes toward interracial contacts in areas like housing and employment. The board of the CCI included some of the leading authorities on black and Jewish “self-hatred”: German and Austrian Jewish émigré scholars like Lewin and Marie Jahoda; American Jewish psychologists like Marion Radke and Isidor Chein; and influential African American social scientists like psychologist Kenneth Clark and sociologist Charles Johnson. Clark (famous along with his wife Mamie for the doll experiments analyzing the racial self-images of black children) and Chein (who studied Jewish self-consciousness) both served as expert witnesses in the NAACP’s postwar legal attack on school segregation.

However, social research on Jewish and black self-hatred would have vastly different implications and applications for the two groups. Policy directives aimed at African Americans emphasized integration. Jewish social scientists at the CCI devised a more complicated public policy for their own group. On the one hand, they endorsed civil rights programs that would eliminate discrimination against all minority groups. On the other hand, they emphasized the need to maintain Jewish distinctiveness. Alfred Marrow, head of the CCI advisory board, recalled the tensions that arose over the seeming paradox in Jewish attitudes. He quoted one black observer who claimed: “We Negroes want to break down barriers whenever possible; the Jews want to preserve many barriers. They seek to integrate but not to assimilate and they pride themselves on their separateness in many ways. We want to end separateness.” If the truth was more complicated, the statement nevertheless captured the differing policy outcomes of postwar research on minority group psychology. John Slawson of the American Jewish Committee later observed that most Jewish leaders had come to believe that “defense against [Jewish] assimilation” was “more urgent than defense against [antisemitic] discrimination.” In the immediate aftermath of the war, however, the discourse on “Jewish self-hatred” was as much about defending against antisemitism as it was about defending against the effects of assimilation.
Critical to these discussions of self-hatred, antisemitism, and the perils of assimilation was the tragic symbol of the German Jew. Writer and political analyst David Bernstein complained in a 1948 article in *Commentary* that “overly emotional” Jewish leaders in the United States tended to distort the “realities” of American Jewish life by making constant reference to the fate of Germany’s assimilated Jews. Although “the history, the culture, the mythology, the ideals of America and Germany are so different as to be almost beyond comparison,” Bernstein observed, “the Jewish failure in Germany” had become the new measure for the dangers of Jewish life in postwar America. “In the minds of most American Jews,” Bernstein asserted, the term “assimilation” had come to symbolize “a hypocritical flight from Jewishness, generally including conversion to Christianity, changing one’s name, denying or at least hiding the fact that one is Jewish. And the Jews of Germany are recalled as the most shameful example of this kind of ‘assimilation’ with the ironic recollection of what happened to them when Hitler achieved power.” Even if Germany’s Jews “did seek to escape” their “Jewish past,” Bernstein argued, “the catastrophe that befell German Jews was not the result of their assimilation. It was the result of Hitlerism.”

The pivotal figure in what might be called the Germanization of postwar American Jewish social thought was émigré social psychologist Kurt Lewin. By the time of his death in 1947 (at the age of 57), Lewin had achieved almost iconic status as the leading theorist of minority group self-esteem and the foremost expert on the problem of “Jewish self-hatred.” The authority of Lewin’s writings on Jewish self-hatred derived not only from his professional standing among social psychologists in Europe and America but also from his own recent experiences as a Jew in Nazi Germany. A former faculty member of the Psychological Institute at the University of Berlin and a highly respected and influential expert on personality structure and the dynamics of the “psychological environment,” Lewin fled to the United States in 1935 and reestablished himself as a leader in the postwar liberal intergroup relations movement.

Lewin turned what he called the personal “shame” that antisemitism had instilled in “the lives of whole generations of Jews” in Germany into a cautionary tale for all American Jews. The canonical text was his much-cited and frequently quoted 1941 essay “Self-Hatred Among Jews”—a piece originally published in the American Jewish Committee–sponsored journal *Contemporary Jewish Record* and reprinted in 1948 in a collection of Lewin’s social scientific writings. In it he argued...
that Jews in America no less than Jews in Germany suffered from “negative chauvinism”—an aversion to Jewish group membership—that bred many “varieties” of Jewish self-hatred. Lewin confessed to his American readers that “dangerous” and “open” expressions of “self-hatred” were extremely rare. Most of the time, wrote Lewin, self-hatred was “subtle,” “indirect,” “under-cover,” and “so blended with other motives that it is difficult to decide in any one particular case whether or not self-hatred is involved.” Yet he also argued that insecurity and self-hatred constituted a universal problem among assimilating Jews throughout the Diaspora, and he speculated that there were “probably more Jews in America today” who have a “negative balance” of esteem for their group than there had been in 1910.

Lewin’s essay provided what would become the standard social scientific definition of Jewish self-hatred when he wrote that “The self-hatred of a Jew may be directed against Jews as a group, against a particular fraction of the Jews, against his own family, or against himself. It may be directed against Jewish institutions, Jewish mannerisms, Jewish language, or Jewish ideals.” He argued that Jewish “self-hatred” and what he described as its parallel among Negroes and other “underprivileged groups” affected the individual’s “total personality.” Yet he also insisted that, in most cases, self-hatred was not a psychiatric but a social phenomenon found in “persons of normal mental health.”

For Lewin, the prototypical self-hating Jew was a “marginal man,” a concept he borrowed from Chicago sociologist Robert E. Park. The Jewish marginal man stands at the border between two groups, “being neither here nor there.” A Jew of this type, Lewin concluded, “will dislike everything specifically Jewish, for he will see in it that which keeps him away from the majority for which he is longing. He will show dislike for those Jews who are outspokenly so and will frequently indulge in self-hatred.” Rather than venting frustration at the rejecting majority, Lewin argued, the Jewish marginal man turned the hostility on himself and other Jews. Here and in earlier writings on the theme, Lewin equated the condition of marginality with all Jews of the western Diaspora. Outside of the enforced ethnic “ghetto,” wrote Lewin, Jews no longer had “clear and strong boundaries” between their own minority group and the wider society. Because of their own status as marginal men, Lewin suggested, it was actually Jewish leaders who manifested the most profound psychological symptoms of marginality. Under the “thin cover of loyalty” to the Jewish minority, these “leaders from the periphery,” as he called them, secretly desired to “leave the Jewish group.” What could be done to combat the “negative chauvinism” that was responsible for the most damaging forms of self-hatred
among Jews? And how could Jews in general be taught to feel less “ashamed” of their group? In Lewin’s view, the main task was to “counteract the feeling of inferiority and the feeling of fear.”

Mothers, fathers, and community leaders needed to build a “clear” and “positive” sense of “Jewishness” that would minimize what he called “the ambiguity” of Jewish identity.

Like other highly assimilated German Jews, Lewin had little affinity for, and perhaps even some aversion to, Jewish ritual and religion, and he acknowledged that the declining importance of religion in modern Jewish life made it difficult for many “to describe positively the character of the Jewish group as a whole.” According to Lewin, it was not a return to the traditions of religion but the development of group “loyalty” that must constitute the basis for a “positive” Jewish identity.

Recent developments in Germany had persuaded him that the status of each individual Jew was tied to the fate of all Jews. And thus each individual had to be willing to “accept active responsibility and sacrifice for the group.” Whether Hitler won or lost the war, Lewin concluded, Jewish “interdependence of fate” was bound to become “the most important determining factor in the life of every single Jew.” He warned that “the life, freedom, and the pursuit of happiness of every Jewish community and every individual American Jew” depended on creating a positive social ground on which Jews could stand together and say “Yes to being a Jew.”

Lewin’s ideas resonated powerfully with the writings of other intellectuals who theorized the concept of Jewish self-loathing. In 1942, the Vienna-educated Columbia University historian Salo W. Baron coined the term “inverted Marranos” to describe the “innumerable Jews” in West European and American Jewish communities “who appear and act outwardly as Jews” and are “recognized as Jews by themselves and their environment” but who “deeply resent this fact.” Despising both their Jewish heritage and “involuntary allegiance,” wrote Baron, inverted Marranos “usually become self-haters of a pathological kind.” He laid the blame on the secularizing movements and outlooks produced by the rise of modern capitalist society: socialism, communism, rationalism, materialism, and “rugged individualism”—all of which broke down the “inner cohesion” of the Jewish community.

French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre’s influential essays in Anti-Semite and Jew, serialized in English translation in Commentary and reissued as a book in 1948, coined the term “inauthentic Jew” to describe
The tortured psyche of the individual who pursued various “avenues of flight” in a fruitless attempt to escape from Jewish identity. The “inauthentic” Jew embraced universalism over Jewish particularism, “looked at his co-religionists with the eyes of the anti-Semite,” and tried “to destroy the Jew in himself.” Every attempt to shed the stigma of Jewishness only served to intensify his hatred for himself and his fellow Jews. By contrast, the “authentic” Jew made the existential choice “to live to the full his condition as a Jew,” accepting his fate “in pride or humiliation” and assuming “the responsibilities and risks that it involves.”

Sartre’s distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic Jew closely resembled German political philosopher Hannah Arendt’s comparisons between the “parvenu” and the “pariah” Jew. Arendt, who immigrated to New York in 1942, used the term “parvenu” to describe the “extreme solitude” of German Jews who desired more than anything to “escape from Jewishness.” In her famous 1944 essay “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition,” Arendt contrasted the parvenu Jew who “aped the gentiles” with the ideal of the rebellious Jewish “pariah” who fought for the right of Jews “as Jews” to “enter the ranks of humanity.” Elsewhere she amplified this argument, writing that the Jewish parvenu “betrayed his people” in exchange for “equal rights” and “personal privileges” within German society. But instead of escaping from the taint of Jewishness, wrote Arendt, the parvenu Jew lived in a totally “ambiguous situation,” a “twilight of favor and misfortune” in which Judaism became a “psychological quality” and a “personal problem.”

The Campaign for “Positive Jewishness”

Although Arendt felt that, in the relatively free and safe environment of the United States, “one does not have to . . . resort to all those desperate and crippling disguises that were common among the rich and educated Jews of Europe,” other observers of the American scene expressed far less confidence. Nathan Pelcovitz spoke for many others when he argued in 1947 that “the central problem of Jewish anti-Semitism [a synonym for Jewish self-hatred], particularly among the youth, continues to be what it has always been: flight from Jewish identity” and the “frantic . . . search for formulae of escape from the consequences of having been born a Jew.” In response to the perceived crisis, the National Jewish Welfare Board, the CCI, and Jewish Community Center workers around the country dedicated themselves to helping youth “achieve a wholesome identification” with the Jewish group. This was critical, Isidor Chein and Jacob Hurwitz argued in a 1950 re-
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port, because Jewish youth’s naturally “broadening horizons” and growing contact with the non-Jewish world heightened feelings of “defensiveness” and “insecurity.”

Lewin’s ideas, in particular, became the cornerstone of an ambitious secular and religious educational outreach campaign designed to build what one participant called “stronger Jewish personalities . . . that can resist infection by the anti-Semitic virus.” Milton Steinberg, influential head of the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City and a leader in the Jewish Reconstructionist movement, with its emphasis on the idea of Jews as a religion and a “civilization,” credited Lewin and Lessing for helping to make clear that, without a strong sense of “self-acceptance,” the “survival” of a distinctive Jewish culture in America could not be guaranteed. Although the problem of self-hatred had not reached the “virulent stage of self-repudiation,” wrote Steinberg, without proper intervention the broader population faced “disintegration of morale and self-esteem.” Reversing Lewin’s claim that religion could not become the basis of group regeneration, Steinberg asserted that the answer to the problem of Jewish “self-contempt” was “not less Judaism but more.”

What did these programs entail and how were they implemented? A key component involved new approaches to “Jewish education.” Whereas Jewish education in Sunday schools, Hebrew schools, and day schools had traditionally focused on prayer, language, and Jewish customs and beliefs, educators like Israel B. Rappoport increasingly stressed the need to inculcate the “positive value” of “Jewishness.” In a policy statement drafted in 1946 for the American Jewish Committee, Rappoport insisted that the “primary task” of Jewish education had to be the prevention of “unwholesome repressions, evasions and inferiority complexes” and the cultivation of “Jewish self-respect.” Although Rappoport believed this could best be accomplished in community-based rather than religious institutions, the proliferating religious day-school movement also began to institute, along with the traditional course of study, a curriculum for promoting Jewish pride and Jewish loyalty, or what one religious educator called a feeling of Jewish psychological “worthwhileness.”

But the postwar campaign for building “positive Jewishness” was largely a secular affair dominated by community centers, professional social workers, and mental health experts. The aim of the secular outreach effort, one Jewish community worker explained in 1949, was to create in young people “identification” with the “totality” of Jewish values, a goal that required “programming for Jewish living.” Many community leaders of the post–World War II era worried along with
social worker Leon Feldman that the American Jew had become an “absentee owner, a missing heir,” who “may even believe that Judaism is rich and noble,” but for whom “being a Jew” implies “no special outlook, acts, or responsibilities . . . only a good deal of ill-understood frustrations.”  

“Self-Hatred” and the Jewish Cold War

Even as it aimed to build a feeling of group “belongingness,” the campaign for “positive Jewishness” had the ironic effect of deepening animosities among Jews. Critics of the movement accused Lewin’s followers of promoting narrow-minded ethnic chauvinism and ideological intolerance. As social psychologist Jack Rothman would later remark in a retrospective analysis of the uses and abuses of Lewinian theory, although Lewin himself had argued for a “balanced” approach to Jewish identity, one that recognized a degree of ambivalence as normal, some Jewish community leaders had extended Lewin’s theories to mean that “if a small dose of [Jewish] identification is good for a person, a larger dose will be still better.” The result, he charged, was a “militant” effort to indoctrinate young people with “an appreciation of Jewish values and practices,” an agenda that demanded rigid distinctions between “those Jews who are ‘positively’ identified and those [self-hating] Jews who are not.”

This critique of “militant” identity indoctrination represented a continuing salvo in the “Jewish Cold War”—a fierce rhetorical struggle animated by the polemics of “Jewish self-hatred.” The ideological struggles of this intra-Jewish war of words focused on questions of Jewish loyalty, security, commitment, and survival—themes that paralleled and mirrored the tensions of America’s postwar political culture. It was this struggle—which unfolded a decade before Philip Roth published his inflammatory story “Defender of the Faith”—that helped establish the conditions of reception (and in some sense the literary terrain) for Roth and other mid-century Jewish writers. Fought against the backdrop of America’s conflict with the Soviet Union and driven by revelations of Nazi totalitarian brutality and domination, this highly emotional intra-Jewish struggle and the rhetoric of “self-hatred” that fueled it expressed deep and perhaps intractable generational, philosophical, and ideological divides. It involved, among other things, fundamental disagreements about what could be said by and about Jews in public and whether nonconforming individuals had a right to speak “as Jews.”
Three groups had a particular stake in the Jewish identity wars of the late 1940s and early 1950s. First and most obvious were the lay leaders, social workers, and educators who championed the campaign for “positive Jewishness” in America and argued, after Lewin, that continued group “survival” among “Diaspora” Jews required a clear and unwavering commitment to group values and institutions. Second, and at one pole of the ideological spectrum, were the so-called militant Zionists: committed Jewish nationalists represented by fiery political orators like Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver and novelist and social critic Ludwig Lewisohn. Son of East European immigrants, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver headed a huge Reform congregation in Cleveland known as “The Temple.” As chair of the Zionist Organization of America, Silver organized mass rallies, lobbied the Washington establishment, and earned a reputation as the most vocal, militant, and uncompromising champion of Jewish statehood. Caustically attacking all opponents of political Zionism, Silver conducted his campaign for Jewish statehood in a manner that his more moderate contemporaries in the Jewish establishment variously described as autocratic, ruthless, and dictatorial. Silver also maintained an “adamant stand” against what his closest colleagues in Cleveland called Jewish “Jew haters” who opposed the Zionist vision and displayed an “anti-Israel bias.”

Although Silver can correctly be labeled a “militant” Zionist in this particular context, the history of American Zionism was in fact far more complex than the militant/moderate dichotomy allowed. Silver pursued an aggressive approach of no compromise with American and British leaders, which put him in conflict with so-called moderates like Rabbi Stephen Wise. But his views were far less extreme than the Revisionist Zionists and other right-wing splinter groups with which he had contact.

If Silver represented the pragmatic politics of militant Zionism, Ludwig Lewisohn’s commitments to Jewish nationalism were more romantic, more spiritual, more deeply personal, and more directly connected to the ideology of Central European Zionism and its emphasis on Jewish self-regeneration. Born in 1882 to a highly assimilated, affluent Jewish family in Berlin, and raised as an immigrant child in rural South Carolina, Lewisohn argued that life in the Diaspora undermined Jewish values. As a young man he had made a self-conscious move away from the Jewish community to embrace Catholicism and then the Methodist faith. Later he became a born-again Jew and an ardent Zionist. Lewisohn’s semi-autobiographical novel *The Island Within* (1928) told the story of a psychiatrist whose work with patients suffering from the “Jewish anti-Jewish complex” leads him to a deeper
understanding of his own tortured Jewish psyche and his conversion to Zionism. Lewisohn and militant nationalists like American Jewish physician Hershel Meyer blamed opposition to the Zionist project on “neurotic self-hatred”; others announced that even the desire to assimilate into the “host” society of the United States was a symptom of “self-hatred” among Jews.

At the opposite end of the spectrum from the Zionist militants was a third constituency consisting of a small but highly visible cohort of self-described “alienated” Jewish nonconformists, sometimes referred to as “the New York Intellectuals.” The nonconformists included an array of liberal Jewish critics and social scientists (in and outside of New York City) who openly expressed uncertainty about the meaning of their own Jewish identities, demanded individual rather than collective definitions of Jewishness, and advocated individual rather than group solutions to the various states of ambivalence and identity confusion that contemporaries called “Jewish self-hatred.” A number of Jewish intellectuals, including Harold Rosenberg and Clement Greenberg, edited and/or wrote for Commentary, a magazine that some of their contemporaries viewed as Jewish self-hatred incarnate. As one unfriendly critic later characterized it: “Commentary is consistently brilliant, but consistently too, a refuge for Jewish literati who enjoy bleeding in public, in dramatic and ostentatious displays of the wounds joyfully sustained in their well-advertised flight from Jews and Judaism.” Lewisohn, who wrote for and edited the journal New Palestine and lectured tirelessly on behalf of the Zionist Organization of America, went further than most when he described the “hopeless illiterate young men who perform in Commentary” as harbingers of Jewish “moral suicide” and “ethnic self-liquidation.”

Commentary’s particular reputation as a hotbed of apostasy and Jewish self-hatred was in some measure predicated on the perception that, though the magazine was not really anti-Zionist, in the words of Norman Podhoretz, neither did it display what some considered sufficiently “pro-Zionist” sentiments. In the mid-1940s, Commentary editor Eliot Cohen had been part of a coterie of Jewish dissident intellectuals—among them Erich Fromm, David Riesman, and Hannah Arendt—who rallied around Judah Magnes, founder of the Ikhud or “Unity” Party—an unsuccessful (and unpopular) movement dedicated to the ideal of Jewish-Arab binationalism in Palestine and opposed to the idea of a sovereign Jewish state.

As much as anything, the backlash against Commentary reflected the magazine’s endorsement of fluid concepts of Jewish identity. As historian Steven J. Zipperstein puts it, contributors to Commentary chal-
lenged rigidly drawn “distinctions between what is and is not Jewish and who does and does not belong to the Jewish community.” 76 Many of the Commentary writers were anti-Stalinist liberals and socialists, some of them former Communists, who denounced all kinds of orthodoxies: religious, ethnic, political, social, intellectual, and artistic. Their foremost concern was the principle of critical detachment and the sanctity of individual self-expression.77 As Cohen put the matter in 1949, though the leadership of the Jewish “community” urged “restraint” on the “free and lively exchange of ideas” for fear that “the goyim hear and ‘use it against us,’” Commentary defended the right of “intellectuals” to engage in “decent” Jewish “self-criticism.”78

All parties in the Jewish Cold War deployed the latest social scientific and theoretical literature on “Jewish self-hatred” to make a case against their adversaries. Participants in the campaign for building “positive Jewishness” in the United States as well as “militant” Zionists borrowed heavily from Lewin’s essays.79 Jewish nonconformists took aim at Lewin’s ideas and instead countered with new psychological theories to bolster their claims for uncensored Jewish self-expression and individual definitions of Jewish identity.

The Discovery of the “Jewish Authoritarian Personality”

Ironically, some of the most important arguments against the movement for “positive Jewishness” derived from disturbing new research on the idea of “the authoritarian personality.” The concept of the authoritarian personality emerged at the intersections of Marxism, Freudianism, and wartime studies of “national character.” Exiled German Jewish psychoanalyst Erich Fromm, author of the best-selling 1941 book Escape from Freedom (already in its eleventh printing in 1950), argued that, while Nazism and fascism appealed strongly to the “authoritarian character” of Germans, the most important psychological effect of modern capitalist culture was the creation of such overwhelming feelings of powerlessness and aloneness, anxiousness, and insecurity that individuals could no longer distinguish their own desires from those imposed from the outside. He warned that the compulsion to escape feelings of powerlessness encouraged a pattern of submission to people and institutions that appeared overwhelmingly strong.80 In the mid-1940s, other exiled Frankfurt School theorists and their American colleagues applied theoretical insights derived from the German context to the American scene, examining the “authoritarian” attitudes of American students, veterans, children, and mental
patients. The most detailed and influential studies appeared in the multivolume 1949–50 series “Studies in Prejudice”—a massive theoretical and empirical project on fascism and antisemitism sponsored by the American Jewish Committee’s Social Scientific Research Department and carried out under the direction of Frankfurt School theorist Max Horkheimer.81

Historians have analyzed the impact of the Frankfurt School thinkers on liberal critiques of the radical right and McCarthyism. But they have paid far less attention to the operations of critical theory in the Jewish identity wars of the 1940s and 1950s. The research on the psychological roots of fascism and mass conformity proved ripe for rhetorical exploitation among Jews. Although “Studies in Prejudice” was conceived as an investigation that would ultimately be used to assist Jewish defense groups in understanding the nature and origins of antisemitism, two of the five volumes in the series had especially important, if unanticipated, implications for the debates surrounding Jewish identity conflict and Jewish self-hatred. The more famous of the two volumes in question was The Authoritarian Personality, authored by Theodor Adorno, Viennese émigré psychologist Else Frenkel-Brunswik (an affiliate at the Berkeley Institute of Child Welfare), San Francisco psychoanalyst R. Nevitt Sanford, and Berkeley psychologist Daniel J. Levinson. The other was Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder by Viennese Jewish émigré social psychologist Marie Jahoda (who had worked earlier with Lewin on the group dynamics of prejudice) and Columbia University–affiliated psychoanalyst Nathan Ackerman.82

The authors of both volumes argued that fascist and antisemitic tendencies sprang from emotional disturbances formed in early childhood. In “Types and Syndromes,” Adorno explained that the Jew “frequently becomes a substitute for the hated father, often assuming, on a fantasy level, the very same qualities against which the subject revolted in the father.”83 Unlike the “tolerant” and “unprejudiced” personality, Frenkel-Brunswik suggested, the “totalitarian personality” displayed “overly rigid” defense mechanisms—which manifested in a tendency to see the world in terms of absolute categories of good and evil and the need to make “conformity” an “all or nothing affair.”84

By far the most startling interpretation to emerge from the “Studies in Prejudice” series was the discovery of a frightening new form of antisemitic psychopathology: the Jewish authoritarian personality. The series had originated with the assumption that Jews were largely the victims of extreme hatred. But in Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder (drawn from the case files of Jewish and non-Jewish psychiatric patients), Jahoda and Ackerman found that Jews also suffered from the

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severe character disorder that was the root of the most virulent forms of antisemitism. In Jahoda and Ackerman’s view, the “intrapsychic determinants of Jewish and gentile anti-Semitism seem to be essentially identical” and sprang from “deep-seated self-rejection” rooted in the psychodynamics of family life. Among Jewish antisemites, Jew-hatred served as a defense mechanism and a convenient scapegoat for the individual’s own emotional deficiencies.

What distinguished Jewish antisemites, they argued, was that their “need for hatred” was directed “more exclusively against other Jews.” Whether “mild or violent,” verbal or behavioral, expressions of hostility toward Jews, including the “self-hatred type of anti-Semitism that some Jews display,” was a product of the interaction between “intrapsychic” and external “social forces” such as majority “group pressures.” According to Jahoda and Ackerman, “Jewish anti-Semitism” was actually a defense against the “self-hatred” that grew out of children’s feelings of inferiority, weakness, and dependence on rejecting, exploitative, and overbearing fathers and mothers. The result of such upbringing, the authors stressed, was a “crippled personality” type. Such an individual engaged in constant striving for acceptance and laid exaggerated emphasis on the “rewards of conformity.” Bruno Bettelheim, a survivor of Dachau and Buchenwald, and coauthor of another volume in the series, had also argued that antisemitism in Jews and gentiles amounted to “a psychological defense” against perceived dangers. For the non-Jew, Bettelheim suggested, the dangers typically originated “in the person,” whereas for the Jew they originated in the antisemitic threat encountered in the outside world. Over time, he insisted, antisemitism in Jew and gentile became “a function of inner motivation rather than outer pressure.” In the wake of these studies came a burgeoning sub-industry of social scientific research devoted to the peculiarities of the so-called Jewish authoritarian personality. Psychologist Joseph Adelson invented the “J-A” or “Jewish authoritarian scale” (modeled after Adorno’s famous “F[ascist] scale”) to measure the dynamics of Jewish authoritarianism. The typical “Jewish authoritarian personality,” he concluded, exhibited an “intolerance of ambiguity,” made “sharp and dichotomous distinctions” between the idea of the “good” and the “bad” Jew, expressed hatred for “nonconformists” and “intellectuals,” and wanted to “flatten Jewish diversity” into a “featureless Babbitry.”

The discovery of the “authoritarian personality”—both its Jewish and gentile varieties—increased the already considerable anxiety about the problem of “Jewish self-hatred.” Psychologist Marian Radke Yarrow (a former member of Lewin’s CCI board) warned Jewish community leaders that the “frightened, frustrated minority child of au-
authoritarianism” might grow into an adult who variously vilified or glorified “ingroups” and “outgroups.” Thus the imperative to create a “clear and positive feeling” of group “belonging” in young people also required planning for better child-rearing practices.91

But the new psychological paradigm also provided rhetorical ammunition for liberal Jewish intellectuals who resisted the dominant drift of postwar American and Jewish calls for unambiguous “commitment” to group values. With equal zeal, nonconforming Jewish intellectuals like Clement Greenberg and Harold Rosenberg—best known today as champions of abstract expressionism and action painting—attacked the “herd” mentality of modern “mass” culture and “mass” thinking and the “herd warmth” and “herd conformity” of Jewish nationalism.92 Responding to the proponents of “positive Jewishness,” Greenberg insisted that “what we might ask of our new Jewish self-consciousness is that it liberate rather than organize us.” Personalizing the matter, he added: “I want to overcome my self-hatred in order to be more myself, not in order to be a ‘good Jew.’”93

Armed with the insights from the psychology of authoritarianism and “self-hatred,” Greenberg accused the Jewish “chauvinists” who attacked Commentary magazine of behaving no differently than the most virulent German nationalists. A “Jewishness” defined strictly in terms of “group loyalty and group conformity,” wrote Greenberg, was no different than what “the Germans made their Germanness.”94 He pointed in particular to “Rabbi [Abba Hillel] Silver,” whom he compared to a totalitarian dictator. Silver had condemned Commentary for promoting the views of “uprooted intellectuals” (a code word for self-hating Jews). “I should like to remind the Rabbi,” wrote Greenberg, “that the term ‘uprooted intellectual’ has been and is a favorite in the totalitarian (and anti-Semitic) lexicon of abuse, from Mussolini and Hitler to Stalin, and that wherever we hear it we can be sure that we shall also hear demagogy and obscurantism.”95

Greenberg had a field day with the proponents of Lewin’s theories. Calling into question the smug self-assurance of the so-called positive Jews, he suggested it was they rather than the Commentary writers who were the real self-haters. In spite of what these “positive” Jews wished to believe, “self-hatred”—or what Greenberg preferred to call Jewish “self-doubt”—was nearly “universal among Jews” and not “confined on the whole to Jews like myself.” Lewin had been mistaken to presume that only “outwardly negative” Jews manifested “self-hatred.” On the contrary, suggested Greenberg, “feeling oneself 100 percent Jewish” was not an “antidote” for self-hatred. Rather, “such a feeling may even increase self-hatred.”96 That the “Jewishness” of so many of these “positive
Jews” was “truculent,” that it was also “aggressive and uncharitable” and “impatient with conceptions of Jewishness other than its own,” that it was overly “prone to polemical violence and name calling” proved to Greenberg that the positive Jews were “exorcising from their own consciousness an image of the Jew that is no less ‘negative’ than that in the minds of the most cringing ‘assimilationist.’”

Rosenberg issued an equally scathing indictment of the ideology of Jewish loyalty, which he compared to the tenets of modern fascism. “Isn’t it the presence of the same modern impulse to be one who is one-hundred-percent-something that makes Jews so uncomfortable when they debate whether one can be both an American and a Jew,” he asked rhetorically. The “basic attraction in our time of orthodoxy and totalitarian philosophies, including nationalism,” he suggested, was the “relief they offered from anonymity and multiple identity.” Perhaps, he speculated, “people freely choose to subject themselves to totalitarian disciplines in order to . . . quiet the anguish of possibility.” But to measure the Jewish individual “by the temperature of his allegiance,” Rosenberg charged, was to endorse “the prevalent ideology of total choice with its exclusion of the possibility of being anything else.” By establishing a rigid measure “of who is a proper Jew and who isn’t,” asserted Rosenberg, the “ideologists of positive Jewishness” had declared “no rights for the non-committed individual.” Like Greenberg, Rosenberg challenged Lewin’s negative image of the so-called marginal man and substituted his own term: the “semi-outsider”—a free-thinking individual who lived his own “history” rather than “the history of others.” The “semi-outsider” saw his Jewishness not as a predetermined biological fact, or a set of agreed-on precepts, but rather as a “voluntary aspect of modern identity” that yielded the “constant possibility of ceasing to be Jewish to a greater or lesser degree.”

Liberal social scientists also entered the rhetorical fray of the self-hatred debate. Sociologist Irwin Rinder, who wrote his dissertation on patterns of “ideological extremity” in the “over” and “under” identified Jew, and his colleague, psychologist Donald T. Campbell, analyzed the politics of Jewish authenticity by comparing the Jewish “authoritarian syndrome” with repressive currents of contemporary American political culture in which “ambivalence, ambiguity, complexity, and pluralism” aroused suspicion and hostility. “On every hand,” complained Rinder and Campbell, an array of “proselytizers,” “patriots,” and “investigating committees” created “pressures toward simplicity, total commitment, absolutism in identity, allegiance, and loyalty.”

Although historians have largely overlooked his contributions to these postwar Jewish identity debates, it was sociologist David Riesman...
who launched the most far-reaching critique of the politics of the “militant minority” and the pressures for Jewish conformity.\textsuperscript{102} In a 1951 \textit{Commentary} essay, he suggested (after Greenberg) that “militant” Jewish nationalists also included assimilated Jews who felt they had to “prove” their commitment to the group and who preyed on the guilty consciences of other assimilated Jews. He accused the nationalists of whipping up hysteria over every antisemitic remark and proceeding as if each slur constituted the moral equivalent to the Nazi “extermination” camps. Every “threat” or “presumed threat” to the Jewish group quickly became a “lever” for the “militant’ minority” of Jewish organizational life, charged Riesman, “much as Russian threats to American interests anywhere reinforce the power of our self-proclaimed militant anti-Communists to put a blanket of ‘unity’ over American life as a whole.”\textsuperscript{103}

Riesman situated his analysis of Jewish conformity and “Jewish self-contempt” in the context of larger social forces. In his famous 1950 book, \textit{The Lonely Crowd} (a work that owed much to the ideas of Erich Fromm), he traced the process by which “other directed” Americans—in order to avoid aloneness—conformed to what their peers, their teachers, and the wider society expected of them.\textsuperscript{104} Assimilating Jews, Riesman suggested, were doubly submerged in the deadening ethos of “the group.” If the new tolerance for “cultural pluralism” meant Jews were not required to conform to the “whole package” of American-defined standards of work, social life, and leisure, Riesman observed, they still had to bow to the pressures of “small-time [ethnic] culture dictators” who “operate” with the tactics of “peer-group censorship.” Most “subservient” were the “almost but not wholly assimilated” Jews who, out of guilt and anxiety, permitted “the Jewish cultural compartmentalizers” to tell them what their “leisure style and friendship practice should be.” Just as “Negroes may be compelled to take pride in jazz or in Jackie Robinson,” wrote Riesman, so “Jews may be required to take pride in Israel or in Einstein.”\textsuperscript{105}

Riesman’s grievances against the “Jewish cultural compartmentalizers” did not stop there. In a series of polemical essays published in \textit{Commentary} and \textit{Phylon} in the late 1940s and early 1950s and later reprinted in \textit{Individualism Reconsidered} (1954), he criticized misguided efforts to solve the problem of “Jewish self-contempt.” Cataloguing the varieties of Jewish self “debasement”—which he blamed on the modern “race for success” in which individuals substituted a “cosmetic self” for the “genuine self”—Riesman cited as evidence the “flourishing state of plastic surgery in Manhattan”; the Jews who “accept the majority’s standards” when they criticize the public behavior of fellow Jews;
and the Jews who “deny as Jews that there are such things as Jews.” And there were the Jews who reacted defensively to stereotypes of “the Jew” by downplaying those traits considered most offensive: “Are Jews very pushy? Very well, we will be very retiring . . . .” The solution Riesman proposed was not ethnic “chauvinism” or “nationalism” but what he called a stance of “moral independence” on the part of the individual Jew. He called that stance “marginality.”

Neither “plastic surgery on ‘Jewish’ noses” nor “psychic efforts” to heal “Jewish souls,” neither the “religiosity of self-Judaizing Jews” nor the “normalizing” strategies of Zionist nationalism would liberate the Jewish self, Riesman argued. What Jews required above all was a “rational system of conduct” based on “the possibility of choice.” Here and in other essays, Riesman argued for a positive revaluation of Robert E. Park’s concept of “marginality.” Overturning the logic of Lewin’s theory that the self-hating Jew was a marginal man and challenging the broader social scientific consensus that “marginality” had a “punishing” effect, Riesman instead suggested that, though “marginality can freeze people with anxiety or nostalgia,” the opposite was also true. “The intellect is at its best, and its ethical insights are at their best, when one is in a marginal position that is not too overpowering.”

“The Faith Defended”: Philip Roth and the Jewish War of Words

Roth was literary heir to these arguments for the moral independence of Jews and against the pressures for groupism. Part of a younger generation of nonconforming intellectuals who rejected the notion that Jewish writers ought to concern themselves with what the “goyim” would think, he refused to characterize Jews as “a happy, optimistic, endearing people” or to present them only as “innocent victims” of anti-Semitic hatred, arguing that to do so would distort the “fact of Jewish experience” and limit the range of “moral possibilities.”

His controversial 1959 short story “Defender of the Faith” both satirizes and updates the decade-long Jewish war of words. A tale about the manipulative use of the accusation of Jewish self-hatred, the story is told from the perspective of Sergeant Nathan Marx, who has just returned from fighting the Nazis in Europe. Back home at the army base in Missouri, his new nemesis turns out to be a fellow Jew, a recruit called Sheldon Grossbart. Playing on the sergeant’s Jewish guilt and anxiety, the scheming Grossbart tries to get the “tight-hearted” Marx (who, like Harpo and Karl, is “one of us”) to grant him special privileges. In the process, Grossbart invokes the full menu of Jewish nostal-
gia—everything from “gefilte fish” to the Yiddish language—and turns every request for favors into a test of Marx’s Jewish loyalty and authenticity. Will Marx be a “defender of the faith” by allowing Grossbart to attend “shul” on Friday evenings, or will he enforce the “goyish” rules of the military by demanding that Grossbart scrub the barracks? Because, as Grossbart reminds Marx, any “good Jew” would know: “that’s when Jews go to services.” Marx’s mission is to teach Grossbart to regard himself as a “man” and not simply as a Jew. “Why can’t you be like the rest?” Marx demands. “This is war, Grossbart. For the time being be the same.”

Every time Marx refuses these Jewish pleadings (for special foods, weekend passes, and classified information), Grossbart (who is probably no more wedded to tradition than Marx) accuses him of being a self-hating Jew. “Why are you persecuting me, Sergeant?” asks Grossbart. “As a Jewish boy I thought you would understand. . . . Ashamed, that’s what you are. So you take it out on the rest of us. They say Hitler himself was half a Jew. Hearing you, I wouldn’t doubt it.” Then, turning from a tone of recrimination to feigned pity, Grossbart tells Marx: “It’s a hard thing to be a Jew. But now I understand . . . it’s a harder thing to stay one. . . . Look at you.”

In a final battle of wills, Grossbart goes behind Marx’s back to pull one more Jewish “string,” this time convincing another officer to allow him to remain “stateside” instead of being shipped off to the Pacific with the rest of his unit. Leaving Marx to complete the thought, Grossbart implores: “We gotta help each other, you know. If the Jews in Germany . . . .” Afterward, an indignant Marx (who refuses to heed his own Jewish grandmother’s dictum that “mercy overrides justice”) has the order “corrected” so that the “liar” Grossbart will go to the Pacific. “What do you have against me . . . against my family?” presses Grossbart. “Would it kill you for me to be near my father, God knows how many months he has left to him? . . . There’s no limit to your anti-Semitism, is there?” Turning Grossbart’s appeals to Jewish group loyalty inside out, Marx replies: “For each other we have to learn to watch out, Sheldon. You told me yourself.” “You call this watching out for me—what you did?” retorts Grossbart. “No,” says Marx, “For all of us.” The story ends on a note of moral ambiguity. Marx has finally prevailed on Grossbart to act like a “man” and accept his “fate” as a soldier in wartime. But now the guilt-ridden Marx, wracked with confusion about his own responsibilities toward a fellow Jew, must accept his own human shortcomings “resisting . . . the impulse to turn and seek pardon for my vindictiveness.”

Some Jewish readers found the story not only deeply offensive but
dangerous. In the words of one rabbi, Roth would earn “the gratitude” of the kinds of people whose antisemitism “ultimately led to the murder of six million in our time.” But in a 1963 essay, Roth defended his story in the pages of *Commentary*. “The only Gentiles the rabbi can imagine looking into *The New Yorker* [which, unlike *Commentary*, was read by a broad American middle-class audience] are those who hate Jews and those who don’t know how to read very well.” On the contrary, Roth insisted, readers would recognize that the moral failings of characters like Grossbart and Marx did not belong to Jews alone but were shared to one degree or another by most people.

Echoing themes in Riesman’s essay on the militant minority of Jewish nationalists, Roth suggested that Jews who cried “Watch out for the goyim!” were not just issuing a “warning” about antisemitism but expressing an “unconscious wish” to separate themselves from the wider society, saying, in effect: “Oh that they were out there, so that we could be together in here!” And, reiterating a point made by David Bernstein a decade earlier in the same magazine, Roth (who was born in 1933) urged that “for those Jews who choose to continue to call themselves Jews there are courses to follow to prevent it from ever being 1933 again that are more direct, reasonable, and dignified than beginning to act as though it is 1933—or as though it always is.” Like those of “most men,” Roth reminded his critics, “the lives of Jews no longer take place in a world that is just landsmen and enemies.”

The response to Roth’s self-defense in *Commentary* further revealed the emotional fault lines of the Jewish Cold War. The magazine published an astonishing seven pages of letters from readers, most from Roth’s detractors; some, however, came from readers who deeply identified with Roth’s position. One was sociologist Seymour Leventman, author of a 1961 study of Jewish generational and family conflict. “When *Children of the Gilded Ghetto* (of which I am co-author) was published,” wrote Leventman, “it was generally attacked from the pulpits, in the Jewish publications, and the English-language Jewish press. . . . I have been called ‘anti-semitic,’ ‘self-hating,’ and ‘smug.’” Another, Jack Goldstein, drew on Cold War imagery to defend Roth’s artistic freedom. Goldstein thought it “not surprising that those who accuse Philip Roth of anti-Semitism are unable to see the author’s compassion for his often unpleasant characters. They judge a work of art by an irrelevant criterion: does it present a good picture of us to them? How like Stalinist criticism which evaluates art in terms of the current task!”

The combat intensified six years later when Roth published *Portnoy’s Complaint* (1969)—a gleefully outrageous portrait of a masturbating, shiksa-chasing, sexual profligate. Zionist writer Marie Syrkin, who re-
coiled at the “vicious” and “grotesque” portrait of Portnoy’s Jewish mother, returned once again to the rhetoric of the postwar era when she condemned Roth’s indulgence in “what the Nazis called rassen-schande (racial defilement)” and claimed that his material came “straight out of the Goebbels-Streicher script.” She saw Portnoy (and his obsession with blond “shikses”) as a character to match Julius Streicher’s “Satanic Jewboy lusting after Aryan maidens.” And she found “little to choose” between Goebbels’ stereotypes of “the dark Jew seeking to defile the fair Nordic” and “Roth’s interpretation of what animates Portnoy.” Had Syrkin “not been constrained by the limitations of space,” Roth later remarked, she “might eventually have had me in the dock with the entire roster of Nuremberg defendants.”

Yet in many respects the anger over Portnoy’s Complaint brought to a noisy climax the three-decade preoccupation with Jewish self-hatred. By the end of the 1970s, the earlier rhetorical and social scientific vogue of Jewish self-hatred had largely dissipated. Although it was never abandoned completely, the concept of self-hatred no longer occupied a central place in the literature on Jewish identity conflict, nor was it a high priority for Jewish social workers and community outreach programs. One partial exception concerned the issue of intermarriage. Jewish leaders and psychologists continued to blame Jewish self-hatred and Jewish self-stereotyping (especially negative stereotypes of Jewish women) for the growing tendency of Jewish men to seek “shiksa” partners. Yet, increasingly, social scientists and community leaders began to argue against psychological interpretations of Jewish behavior.

Sociologist Marshall Sklare challenged the longstanding claim that “self-hatred” caused intermarriage, arguing that it was neither social or personal “pathology” but rather changing social conditions and social attitudes—particularly the adoption of liberal notions of equality by gentiles and Jews—that encouraged intermarriage and thereby imperiled the “Jewish future.”

More important, the declining social scientific and communal interest in the problem of Jewish self-hatred reflected a wider intellectual and political backlash against the stigmatizing research on minority group psychopathology and a growing emphasis on ethnic and racial “pride.” As one rabbi later put it, in the campaign to strengthen Jewish identity in the United States many community leaders eventually came to believe that more harm than good would come from focusing attention on “doom and gloom” topics like “Jewish self-hatred.” Here and there one could find examples of the older rhetoric, as in the case of a writer who wondered in 1985 whether the “high rates of Jewish teenage suicide and substance abuse,” “the high rate of Jewish inter-

[119]
“The Israel Question” and the Polemics of Self-Hatred

Once situated in broad wartime and postwar debates about the effects of antisemitism, assimilation, and the complicated psychodynamics of minority group life, the concept of Jewish self-hatred was steadily emptied of most of its earlier psychological, social, and theoretical content and became largely a slogan.

Where the concept did reemerge with new polemical force was in two key political arenas: debates about Jewish sympathies for black activism; and debates about “support” for Israel. Even before the rise of Black Power politics in the late 1960s, historian Michael Staub has shown, a spectrum of Jewish writers and leaders—ranging from Zionists like Syrkin and Conservative rabbis like Arthur Hertzberg to liberal non-Zionists like sociologist Nathan Glazer—argued that the integration of African Americans into Jewish neighborhoods, schools, and businesses threatened “the apartness” and “voluntary self-segregation” that supposedly enabled Jewish institutions and values to survive. “Self-respecting” Jews understood this, asserted Syrkin, “self-hating Jews” did not. Describing the “masochistic approach” of “some Jewish spokesmen” who pushed for black entry into heavily Jewish residential and educational domains, Yeshiva University professor Abraham Duker claimed in 1965 that they acted out of a desire to escape from Jewishness. In certain cases, he suggested, “escapist identification of Jews with the integration struggle” bore a striking resemblance to the “extreme jüdischer Selbsthass” depicted in Lessing’s “classical study.”

In the 1960s and 1970s, an even more protracted and bitter form of self-hatred polemics (some, but not all of it, driven by Jewish engagements with black activism) centered on the question of loyalty to Israel. The Israel-centered polemics of Jewish self-hatred was not entirely new, nor did it emerge all at once. Since the 1940s, “militant” Zionists had used the derogation “Jewish self-hatred” to castigate critics of Jewish statehood. However, a new chapter opened in 1963 when Hannah Arendt—who had opposed the idea of Jewish statehood—published a controversial series of articles on the Jerusalem trial of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann. The series, which later appeared in her book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, offended American...
Jewish critics from across the political and intellectual spectrum—from rabbis to nonconforming intellectuals—many of whom denounced Arendt as a “self-hating Jew” who was “anti-Semitic,” “anti-Zionist,” and “anti-Israel.”129 Arendt’s book argued that, far from being a perverse madman, as the Israeli prosecution hoped to show, Eichmann was a frighteningly normal product of a totalitarian society where a “law abiding” citizen was more likely to follow orders than pay attention to morality or “conscience.” But those who labeled her a “self-hating Jew” focused largely on two other claims in *Eichmann in Jerusalem*. First was Arendt’s argument about the moral collapse of Jewish leadership throughout Nazi-occupied Europe. Second was her criticism of the Israelis’ conduct of the trial. She set the tone in the opening pages of her book, where she described the proceedings in Jerusalem as a “show trial” orchestrated by an “invisible stage manager”—Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion—whose overarching purpose was to “strengthen Jewish consciousness” by teaching the younger generation the lesson Holocaust survivors already knew: that “only in Israel could Jews be safe and live an honorable life.”130

Ironically, in the torrent of criticism that followed the publication of her trial “report,” Arendt’s reputation as an erudite theorist of totalitarianism and a trenchant critic of German Jewish parvenuism would largely be effaced by an image of her as a “self-hating Jew” whose “blinding animus” toward the Jewish state, in the words of Syrkin (who was later to attack Roth as a Jewish racial defiler), distorted her perspectives on Eichmann, Jews, and “justice in Israel.”131 Even the formerly “alienated” socialist intellectual Irving Howe, whose recent “reconquest of Jewishness” entailed “a growth of feeling for the new state of Israel,” objected to what he called Arendt’s “hostility” and “contempt” for “established Jewish institutions, especially Zionist ones.”132 For Howe and other critics, it was not just what Arendt had written but where her trial reports had initially appeared: in *The New Yorker*, a magazine whose readers knew or cared little for the facts of Jewish history, and one that did not publish letters or “rebuttals” from readers. In the pages of *Commentary*, Howe took *The New Yorker* (and its marginally Jewish editor William Shawn) to task for refusing to print “the refutations of highly responsible and scholarly opponents of Miss Arendt,” thus allowing her to have “the first, the last, and the only word.” As a result, charged Howe, “hundreds of thousands of good middle-class [gentile] Americans will have learned from those articles that the Jewish leadership in Europe was cowardly, inept, and even collaborationist; that the Jewish community helped the Nazis achieve their goal of racial genocide.”133
In the years following the “excommunication” of Arendt, and especially in the aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the growing “feeling for Israel” was accompanied by a growing political intolerance for public criticism of the Jewish state. Willingness to give moral and financial “support” to Israel constituted what one historian called “the existential definition of American Jewishness.” Yet the opposite was also true. Criticism of Israel constituted the existential definition of “Jewish self-hatred.” As political scientist Charles Liebman observed in 1973, many American Jews had come to believe that “nonsupport for Israel [w]as a greater ‘crime’ for a Jew than the ‘crime’ of intermarriage.”

Thus, when liberal Berkeley psychologist Judith Weinstein Klein began in the mid-1970s (with funding from the American Jewish Committee) to experiment with Jewish “ethnotherapy”—a technique designed to help participants confront “their own internalized anti-Semite”—a key indicator was their response to the so-called Israel question. In addition to having other Jews as close friends, being involved in Jewish institutional life, and accepting one’s Jewish “body image,” having “positive Jewish identity” entailed “a willingness to defend Israel if its survival was at stake.” By that criterion, a young woman with minimal Jewish religious ties and a desire to “help negotiate peace by making Israel realize its discriminatory chauvinistic attitudes toward Palestinians” was judged to have “a masochistic relationship with Jewishness.”

Even Commentary, once considered the venue of self-hating Jews with questionable commitments to the Zionist project, eventually came, under the editorial supervision of Norman Podhoretz, to represent the voice of a staunch “pro-Israelism.” “Old Left” critics like journalist I. F. Stone, who attacked Israel for victimizing Arabs, and younger “New Left” activists who failed to take a critical stance toward the anti-Zionist rhetoric of the “Black Power” and “Third World” freedom struggles were roundly condemned in the pages of Commentary.

In a 1967 Commentary article on “The American Left and Israel,” Martin Peretz (then in his late twenties and later to become editor of The New Republic) criticized the “apostasy” of Jewish radicals who weighted “the moral scales against Israel.” He directed most of his anger toward “radical ideologues at the top” (a reference to members of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee) who expressed “almost complete sympathy with the politics of Israel’s enemies.” He contrasted them to the Jewish “rank-and-file” who had been “forced out of the movement” because of their commitment to “Israel’s very survival.” Twenty years later, the derogation “Jewish self-hatred” lived on in the words of Orthodox rabbi Daniel Landes, who announced at a confer-
ence hosted by the liberal Jewish magazine *Tikkun* that every time the “Jewish Left” portrayed Palestinians in the West Bank as “victims,” they gave voice to “internalized anti-Semitism” and Jewish “self-hatred.” Criticism of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir was permissible, he declared, but “criticism of Zionism” was “illegitimate.”

By century’s end, the uses and associations of the term “Jewish self-hatred” had shifted dramatically. In the 1940s, émigré social scientists like Lewin had given it broad intellectual authority and helped move the terminology to the center of American social thought where, by the early 1950s, its descriptive usefulness was defended and debated by the combatants of the Jewish Cold War. And long after the phrase “Jewish self-hatred” had lost its explanatory power and its intellectual currency in postwar debates about Jewish psychology, antisemitism, and assimilation, bitter divisions over “the Israel question” would ensure its continued rhetorical vitality.

**Notes**

Earlier versions of this article were presented at meetings of the Organization of American Historians, the European Social Science History Association, and the Walter Chapin Simpson Center for the Humanities. I would like to thank James Gregory, Ross Posnock, Robert Westbrook, Noam Pianko, David Shields, Caroline Simpson, Paul Reitter, and the anonymous reviewer for this journal for their helpful comments.

3 Sol Liptzin, “The Vogue of Jewish Self-Hatred,” *Congress Weekly*, Mar. 18, 1957, pp. 11–13. Liptzin, a Russian Jew and a Zionist, was then professor of Comparative Literature at City College. He had made similar comments about German Jewish intellectuals in *Germany’s Stepchildren* (Philadelphia, 1944).
4 Paul Reitter, “Karl Kraus and the Jewish Self-Hatred Question,” *Jewish Social Studies* n.s. 10, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 78. Reitter challenges one-
dimensional views of Kraus’s antisemitic writings, arguing that they contained much more irony and satire than is commonly acknowledged.

5 David Brenner argues that the term “Jewish self-hatred” was less a description of social “reality” than a “rhetorical tool” and a “cultural construct,” and he criticizes Sander Gilman for failing to distinguish between the two. See David Brenner, Marketing Identities: The Invention of Jewish Ethnicity in “Ost und West” (Detroit, 1998), 164–65. See also Reitter, “Karl Kraus.”


10 On Holocaust consciousness and “survival anxiety” as a phenomenon of the 1960s and later, see Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston, 1999), 186–99.


15 Jo Sinclair, Wasteland (1946; reprint, Philadelphia, 1987). Jake’s “self-hatred” was largely Oedipal. It grew out of his hatred for his stingy, dirty, Jewish father. In recent years, Wasteland, which also features a lesbian character related to Sinclair’s own life-history, has found a new audience among feminist and Jewish literary critics. See, e.g., Gay Wilentz, “Healing the ‘Sick Jewish Soul’: Psychoanalytic Discourse in Jo Sinclair’s (Ruth Seid’s) Wasteland,” Literature and Psychology (Spring/Summer 2001): 68–83, which explores the autobiographical aspects of the novel as well as its thematic tensions.

16 Israel B. Rappoport, Education for Living as American Jews (New York, 1946), 8, 53.


25 Marrow, *Practical Theorist*, 195. See also Isidor Chein and Jacob Hurwitz, “The Reaction of Jewish Boys to Various Aspects of Being Jewish,” mimeo-

26 Quoted in Marrow, *Practical Theorist*, 195. Marrow, who was part of the CCI team, does not name the speaker, but it is likely Kenneth Clark, who elsewhere pointed to the hypocritical stances taken by Jewish leaders who claimed that the condition of the two groups was comparable.


29 On Lewin’s background and training, see Marrow, *Practical Theorist*, 40–41, 54, 59–60, 63, 73–85.


32 Ibid., 187.

33 Ibid., 197.

34 Ibid., 187.

35 Ibid., 197, 189.


39 Ibid., 198 (emphasis in original).


41 Ibid., 180.


44 Ibid., 190, 198.
46 Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, 90–95, 96–97, 103, 136, 141. These essays were first published in Paris in 1946 as Réflexions sur la Question Juive. Stuart Z. Charmé has explored late-twentieth-century philosophical permutations of Sartre’s paradigm of authenticity as existential choice; see his “Varieties of Authenticity in Contemporary Jewish Identity,” Jewish Social Studies n.s. 6, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 133–55.
52 Chein and Hurwitz, “Reaction of Jewish Boys,” 1, 3.
55 Israel B. Rappoport, Education for Living as American Jews (New York, 1946), 2, 9, 10, 17, 19, 31, 40, 53–54.
59 Rothman, Minority Group Identification, 7.
60 Ibid.; see also pp. 9, 22, 70, 78, 79.
62 Lewisohn was typical of Zionists who argued that the “Diaspora” had an unhealthy effect on Jewish life. See also Hershel Meyer, “Nationalism and


64 Raphael, *Abba Hillel Silver*, 183. The remarks concerned the leaders of the suburban Reform Jewish community who broke away from Silver’s temple.


70 For an important statement from the perspective of the editor, see Eliot Cohen, “The Intellectuals and the Jewish Community: The Hope for Our Heritage in America,” *Commentary* 8 (July 1949): 27–29.


75 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World* (New Haven, Conn., 1982), 225–27. See also Dagmar Barnouw, *Visible Spaces: Hannah Arendt and the German-Jewish Experience* (Baltimore, Md., 1990). The response, even among the *Commentary* crowd, to Hannah Arendt’s 1945 article “Zionism Reconsidered” suggests the volatility of “the Israel question.” Arendt made it clear that, though she supported the goal of establishing a Jewish “homeland” in Palestine, she opposed any idea of a Jewish “state” that left Arabs “the choice between voluntary emigration or second-class citizenship.” Equally controversial was her claim that the Zionist supporters of Jewish statehood contributed to the repressive political “conformity,” the “fanaticism and hysteria,” and the pressure for “unanimity” that characterized “the modern mass age.” So controversial were these ideas that even the otherwise irreverent *Commentary* editor Clement Greenberg declined to publish it because “the unfriendly
reader” might find it “anti-Semitic” in its “implications.” See Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, 104–5. On the resonances between the article and her views in Eichmann in Jerusalem, see 206 n. 5. The article was published in Menorah Journal 33 (Aug. 1945) and reprinted in Michael Seltzer, ed., Zionism Reconsidered (New York, 1970).


77 On the themes of individualism, alienation, and critical detachment for liberal Jewish (and non-Jewish) intellectuals, see Richard Pells, Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age (New York, 1985), 74–75, 135, 186–87.


84 Else Frenkel-Brunswik, “Summary of Interview Results,” in Adorno et al., Authoritarian Personality, 281–86. Freud in the 1930s had also located the origins of self-hatred in the child’s hatred for his father. On this point, see L. Baron, “Theodor Lessing,” 325.


86 Ackerman and Jahoda, Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder, 80.
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87 Ibid., 19, 69, 76–79.
88 Ibid., 55, 73. See also Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans (New York, 1950).
89 In the Nazi concentration camps, which Bettelheim saw as an extreme microcosm of the larger antisemitic world, Jews reacted to the “threat of aggression” and defended against their own ego disintegration by making the “gestapoman” into an all-powerful force against which no real resistance was possible. Rather than accept the idea of their own “inferiority” or weakness, Bettelheim argued, Jews symbolically “borrowed power” from the Nazis, creating a “delusional defense mechanism” by which they imagined themselves as dependent “infants” at the mercy of forces beyond their control. See Bruno Bettelheim, “The Dynamics of Anti-Semitism in Gentile and Jew,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 42 (Apr. 1947): 153–54, 156–57, 158, 159, and Bruno Bettelheim, “Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 38 (1943): 417–52.
94 Ibid., 428–29.
95 Ibid., 431, 432.
96 Ibid., 431–32.
97 Ibid., 426–27, 428, 429–30, 432–33. Six years earlier, Greenberg had criticized American Jews for their “suffocatingly middle-class behavior.” See his comments in “Under Forty,” 33. For a more extensive discussion of
Greenberg’s Jewish identity and intellectual engagements, see Florence Rubenfeld, *Clement Greenberg: A Life* (New York, 1997). For a related but somewhat different examination of Greenberg’s uses of Lewin, see Bloom, *Prodigal Sons*, 144.


99 Ibid., 508.


105 Riesman et al., *Lonely Crowd*, 334–36. See also Riesman, “‘Militant’ Fight,” 140.


108 Ibid., 162–63.


112 Ibid., 197–98.

113 Ibid., 199.

114 Ibid., 200.

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116 Ibid., 208. See also Roth, “Some New Jewish Stereotypes,” 189. Ironically, whereas some Jewish readers found the story risky and offensive, The New Yorker, which rejected most of Roth’s work, found it much less “impolite” and less full of “caricature” than some of his other stories. See Ben Yagoda, About Town: The New Yorker and the World It Made (New York, 2000), 300.


119 Quotes in Roth, Reading Myself, 278.


121 Roth, Reading Myself, 278.


124 On the backlash against “psychopathology,” see Scott, Contempt and Pity. On the concern about “doom and gloom” prophecy, see Sandra V. Haring, “Jewish Communal Responses to the Problem of Internalized Oppression,” Jewish Social Work Forum 29 (Spring 1994): 74–75. Ronald M. Demakovsky, “Jewish Anti-Semitism and the Psychopathology of Self-Hatred” (Ph.D. diss., California School of Professional Psychology, 1978), complained that research in this field had virtually ceased; most of his theoretical apparatus drew from the empirical and polemical research of the 1940s and 1950s. See also Haring, “Jewish Communal Responses,” for a similar statement.

125 Haring, “Jewish Communal Responses,” 77.


133 Howe, “‘The New Yorker’ and Hannah Arendt,” 318–19. Ben Yagoda claims that Arendt had first approached *Commentary* about covering the trial, but they declined because of the expense of sending her to Jerusalem to cover the trial. See Yagoda, *About Town*, 317–18. On Shawn’s marginal Jewishness, see ibid., 297. Although Yagoda does not suggest this, it also seems possible that Arendt’s critical stance toward the Jewish state may have made the new editor of *Commentary*, Norman Podhoretz, reluctant to sponsor her series.

134 I borrow the notion of her “excommunication” from Aschheim’s introduction to *Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem*.


138 Norman Podhoretz, *Ex-Friends* (New York, 1999), 167–68. The term “pro-Israelism” is Steven Cohen’s; see his *American Modernity and Jewish Identity*, 154, 164. Eventually Podhoretz would argue that the radical American right wing—consistently more dedicated to a strong military policy and
support of Israel—was less “antisemitic” than the New Left. Later he would borrow from the internal dialogue on Jewish identity conflict to lash out at critics of America’s Vietnam policy. Although Podhoretz had also opposed the Vietnam War, by the 1980s he was ready to characterize as “weak and self-hating critics of America” those who failed to recognize the need to defend against the communist menace. See Neil Jumonville, *Critical Crossings: The New York Intellectuals in Postwar America* (Berkeley, 1991), 200–201, and Shapiro, *A Time for Healing*, 212, 225–28. For an example of this pro-Israelism, see Robert Alter, “Israel and the Intellectuals,” *Commentary* 44 (Oct. 1967): 46–52.


Abstract

This article asks how and why the concept of “Jewish self-hatred” came into theoretical, social scientific, literary, and critical vogue in 1940s and 1950s America. It argues that the proliferating public discourse on Jewish self-hatred grew out of three overlapping developments. First was the influence of psychological experts on American public life. Second was the influence of German Jewish émigré intellectuals like Kurt Lewin in giving social scientific legitimacy to the idea of Jewish self-hatred. Third was the polemical deployment of the concept of Jewish self-hatred and the idea of “the authoritarian personality” in the Jewish Cold War—a contentious public debate among defenders of Jewish particularism and Jewish nationalism, on the one hand, and proponents of liberal universalism, on the other. This debate revolved around questions of Jewish group loyalty, survival, and belonging, and it included figures as diverse as...
Ludwig Lewisohn, David Riesman, Philip Roth, Clement Greenberg, and Harold Rosenberg.

Keywords: Jewish self-hatred, authoritarian personality, Jewish identity discourse, Cold War, Kurt Lewin, David Riesman, Philip Roth, Clement Greenberg